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M.ARITAL PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION:
LEGAL AND EMOTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
NORMAN PERLBERGERt

I. PSYCHOLOGICAL AND EMOTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

THE TEARS AND SLEEPLESS NIGHTS, the obligatory
AFTER
talk with the kids, and

the smothering comfort of well-wishers,
inevitably comes one's confrontation with the future. There is often a
sudden awareness that, while the spiritual body of the marriage has
shattered, the security and permanence of the material objects acquired during marriage still remain. Correspondingly, a sense of
foreboding and insecurity accompanies the prospect of dividing the
marital estate, thereby stripping the family unit of its material stability.
How the client approaches this phase of the divorce process depends, of course, on the individual. 1 Many view the property symbolically and their responses to its division can be predicted from
their basic approach to life. My experiences have taught me that the
attorney can expect one of three reactions from the divorcing client.
If the individual is able to live independently, the property demands
can range from a reasonable request for an equal split of joint assets
to the overreaction and extremism of proclaiming to want nothing. If
the individual is dependent and insecure, the demands will be for a
greater portion of the tangible property in order to restore security.
For example, such an individual might unhesitatingly give up a claim
to shares of stock, yet insist that the dining room set remain undisturbed in the family home. Finally, if the individual is an avenger,
although not motivated by greed or security concerns, he or she may
view the property division as a formidable battleground where emotional defeat can be replaced by financial victory. This third kind of
litigant commonly identifies a single item as a focus for combat and
refuses to yield, bargain, or consider substitutes of equal or greater
value.
In the final analysis, however, the divorce process is more a matter of material considerations than a resolution of symbolic concerns.
f Partner, Blank, Rome, Comisky & McCauley, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. B.A., Temple
University, 1967; M.S., Temple University Graduate School, 1968; J.D., Temple University
School of Law, 1972. Member, District of Columbia, Florida, and Pennsylvania Bars. Mr.
Perlberger is the co-author of Pennsylvania Family Law.
1. For an extensive discussion of the psychological aspects of the divorce process, see Kaslow, Stages of Diorce: A Psychological Perspective, Symposium: Recent Developments in
Pennsylvania Family Law, 25 VILL. L. REV. 718 (1980).
(662)
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For the attorney, valuation predominates over psychological evaluation. Yet, the sensitive and perceptive practitioner can accomplish
material objectives within reasonable limits while also identifying the
emotional forces involved; in so doing, he or she may be successful in
assuaging the client's pain.
Thus, before the practitioner can serve the client's economic
needs, it is important for him not only to be versed in the law but
also to have an understanding of the impact of divorce on the fanily. 2 While there exists a heated debate as to whether or not an
attorney should attempt to act as a counselor, 3 it is doubtful that an
attorney can practice family law effectively while lacking knowledge of
the dynamics of the divorce process. The lawyer does a disservice to
his client's psychological well-being, as well as to the legal profession
in general, if he permits the divorce process to become a forum for
4
venting the anger and frustration of a broken marriage.
The lawyer must remain calm amidst heated passions. To serve
the client well, the practitioner must have an understanding of the
nonlegal intricacies of divorce as well as a total familiarity with the
applicable law. Thus, this article begins with a brief discussion of the
emotional or psychological stages of the divorce process 5 and proceeds to review the law of property distribution in Pennsylvania.' It
is hoped that this format will provide a framework upon which the
practitioner can sensitively apply the pertinent legal principles.
II.

THE STAGES OF DIVORCE

In a remarkable book entitled On Death and Dying, 7 Elisabeth
KILbler-Ross identifies and analyzes five stages" through which individuals pass in dealing with their own death or with the death of a
close friend or relative. Those stages are as follows: first, denial and

2. See id. at 718-20, 730-40.

3. For a discussion of the role of the attorney in the area of matrimonial disputes, see
Turner, The Role of the Lawyer in Matrimonial Cases, Symposium: Recent Developments in
Pennsylvania Family Law, 25 VILL. L. REX'. 676 (1980). See also Callner, Boundaries of
the Divorce Lawyer's Role, 10 FAXI. L.Q" 389, 391-94 (1977); Fain, The Role and Responsibility
of the Lawyer in Custody Cases, 1 FAM. L.Q., Sept. 1967, at 36, 39-46; Kargman, The
Lawyer's Role in Divorce Reconciliation, 6 PPAc. LAW, Mar. 1960, at 21; Merder, The Need for
an Expanded Role fir the Attorney in Divorce Counseling, 4 FAM. L.Q. 280 (1970).
4. See Beatrice, Divorce: Problems, Goals and Growth Facilitation, 60 J. CONTEMP. SOC.
WORK, Mar. 1979, at 157, 158.

5. See notes 7-27 and accompanying text infra.
6. See notes 28-96 and accompanying text infra.
7. E. KO1BLER-ROSS, ON DEATH AND DYING (1969).

8. For examples of other stage theories, see Kaslow, supra note 1, at 720-51.
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isolation; 9 second, anger;

10
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third, bargaining; 11 fourth, depression;

12

13

The stages of divorce are perceived by this
and fifth, acceptance.
author as identical to those which Kiibler-Ross associates with
death.14 Divorce, after all, is the death of a family unit.1 5 The married person was someone else; the separated or divorced person is a
new entity. 16 One important period of the individual's life is forever
dead. It is hoped that, by examining Kiibler-Ross' stages of adjustment to death, the practitioner will be better prepared to understand
the divorcing client who is going through much the same process.
A. Denial and Isolation
This stage involves the victim's initial shock and disbelief that
death is approaching or has occurred to someone dear. 17 Denial is
accompanied by isolation characterized by an unwillingness to discuss
the topic with others.' 8 Similarly, the divorce victim often presents
himself or herself in a state of psychological and emotional shock. The
client disbelieves his or her own situation and often remarks to the
practitioner that it is impossible for an attorney to imagine how the
client feels.
B. Anger
Denial is often replaced by anger and resentment. 19 According
to Kibler-Ross, the dying patient typically displays this anger at ran-

9. See E. KUBLER-ROSS, supra note 7, at 34-43; notes 17-18 and accompanying text infra.
10. See E. KOBLER-Ross, supra note 7, at 44-71; notes 19-20 and accompanying text infra.
11. See E. KUBLER-ROSS, supra note 7, at 72-74; notes 21-22 and accompanying text infra.
12. See E. KUBLER-ROSS, supra note 7, at 75-98; notes 23-24 and accompanying text infra.
13. See E. KiUBLER-Ross, supra note 7, at 99-121; notes 25-27 and accompanying text infra.
14. See E. Ki)BLER-Ross, supra note 7, at 3. Kiubler-Ross herself recognized the comparison between death and divorce:
It is vell to remember that the child will react in the samve manner [as he does on the
death of a parent] if he loses a parent by divorce, separation, or desertion. Death is often
seen by a child as an impermanent thing and has therefore little distinction from a divorce
in which he may have an opportunity to see a parent again.
Id. (emphasis added). For other analogies of the Kibler-Ross theory to divorce, see Beatrice,
supra note 4, at 160; Froiland & Hozman, Counseling for Constructive Divorce, 55 PERSONNEL AND GUIDANCE J. 525 (1977). For a variation on this theory, see Wiseman, Crisis Theory
and the Process of Divorce, 56 Soc. CASEWORK 205 (1975). Wiseman combines the Kiibler-Ross
theory with the process of "rejection of the lost object and acceptance of new patterns of living"
peculiar in the divorce context to arrive at five modified stages: 1) denial; 2) loss and depression;
3) anger and ambivalence; 4) reorientation of lifestyle and identity; and 5) acceptance and integration. Id. at 206.
15. See Froiland & Hozman, supra note 14, at 525.
16. See Wiseman, supra note 14, at 209-12.
17. E. KOBLER-Ross, supra note 7, at 34-43.

18. Id.
19. Id. at 44.
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dom. 20 By contrast, it is my experience that the client involved in a
divorce proceeding tends to focus his or her anger on the other
spouse by seeking retribution.
C. Bargaining
This stage is identified by the patient rationalizing an eventual
cure or possible postponement of the terminal illness. 21 In the divorce process, bargaining may manifest itself by the client's expressed
hopes of, or actual attempts at, reconcilation. 22 Sometimes, an oppressive amount of litigation or negotiation is initiated in an effort to
bring the reluctant spouse to his or her senses. If the attempt at
reconciliation fails, the externalized anger associated with stage two is
often exacerbated.
D. Depression
In death or divorce, this stage follows the recognition that the
end of life or marriage is inevitable. 23 It is a period marked by profound withdrawal, self-pity, a poor sense of self-identity, and chronic
despair.24
E. Acceptance
Kiibler-Ross observed that the dying patient ultimately accepts
the inevitable and seeks to spend his or her remaining days in
peace. 25 This internal harmony is the healthy consequence of having
passed through the other four stages. 26 The survivor of a loved one's
death learns to continue living and finds that good can follow tragedy.
In the divorce process, the spouses often reach an agreement on all
marital issues and proceed to an uncontested divorce. In this way,
the parties eventually come to accept the divorce and begin to re27
build their lives.

20. 1d.
21. Id. at 73.
22. See Froiland & Hozman, supra note 14, at 527.
23. E. KOBLER-Ross, supra note 7, at 76. Kiibler-Ross identifies this kind of depression as

preparatory, not reactive, because it "does not occur as a result of a past loss but is taking into
account impending losses." Id. According to Kiibler-Ross, the individual should be allowed to
express his or her sorrow, rather than be discouraged from doing so through reassurances. Id.
at 77.

24. See Froiland & Hozman, supra note 14, at 528-29.
25. See E. KOBLER-Ross, supra note 7, at 99-101.
26. Id.
27. See Beatrice, supra note 4, at 157.
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Recognition of these emotional or psychological stages is important for a lawyer engaged in divorce representation. It is important to
note, however, that the attorney's involvement in the process does
not always begin at stage one. The client may consult the attorney for
the first time during any one of the stages. New clients will be seen
in deep shock and uncertain of their futures (stage one), revengeful
and defensive about their contributions to the marital breakdown
(stage two), anxious to reconcile and insistent that divorce is not on
their minds (stage three), terribly bereft with a low sense of selfesteem (stage four), or ready for a quick and painless divorce (stage
five). Having provided the reader with an overview of the complexity
of the emotional element, this article will now shift its focus to the
legal principles which control the possibility of success in negotiations
and the courtroom.
III.

APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES

A. Societal and Historical Prejudices
1. Wife as Chattel
At common law, a wife was regarded as her husband's property,
a mere chattel. 2 8 This status was soundly criticized in Neuberg v.
Bobowicz, 29 where the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania refused to extend to wives the right to recover on a cause of action for loss of
consortium. 30 The Neuberg court held that this right of recovery,
which is based on the concept of the wife as chattel, 3 1 is an anachronism without present day justification, and therefore, should not be
32
extended.
In addition to judicial action such as Neuberg, the Pennsylvania
Legislature has enacted a series of statutes, starting with the Married

28. See Neuberg v. Bobowicz, 401 Pa. 146, 150, 162 A.2d 662, 664 (1960). Reviewing this
traditional relationship between husband and wife, the Neuberg court stated:
In effect, the woman spouse was her husband's chattel, his property. She owed him
duties much the same as did a servant his master. If he by injury to her suffered a loss of
some feudal service owing to him by her, he and he alone-for she was too inferior a
subject to have any such right, much less the privilege to assert it-was allowed to sue to
recover, just as he would sue for injuries done to his cattle.
Id. at 150, 162 A.2d at 663-64.
29. 401 Pa. 146, 162 A.2d 662 (1960).
30. Id. at 150-58, 162 A.2d at 664-67.
31. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
32. Id. The court intimated that if the issue had been presented, it would also have voided
the husband's right to recover under this "embarrassing left-over from another day and age."
Id. at 154-55, 162 A.2d at 666 (dictum).
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Women's Acts at the turn of the century 3 3 and culminating in the
equal rights amendment (ERA) to the Pennsylvania Constitution in
1971, 3 4 which have ultimately eradicated the wife's common law subservient status. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in numerous recent decisions, has relied upon the Pennsylvania ERA in order to
extend to men and women various rights previously held exclusively
by the opposite sex. 35 For example, in Hopkins v. Blanco, 36 the
court was again faced with a wife's demand for recovery for loss of
consortium. 37 This time, however, it declined to follow the Neuberg
court's refusal to extend such a right of recovery to wives; instead,
the Hopkins court extended that right to wives based on the requirement that there be equality of the sexes as established by the
38
Pennsylvania ERA.
Similarly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in DiFlorido v. Di-

Florido,3 9 ruled that household furnishings and other nontitled prop-

33. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, §§ 32.1-92 (Purdon 1965). The Married Women's Acts define
the substantive rights of married women vis-ii-vis the world in general and the husband in
particular. Id. Areas covered by the statute include the following: property and contract rights,
id. § 32.1; entitlement to separate earnings, id. § 34; transfer of loans and stock, id.§ 36;
control over property for purposes of trade, id. §§ 41-44; sale of land by absent husband, id. § 61;
debts contracted for support of family, id. § 63; and disputes regarding child custody, id. § 92.
34. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 28. The text of ERA states: "Equality of rights under the law shall
not be denied or abridged in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because of the sex of the
individual." Id. For a discussion of the Pennsylvania ERA, see generally Momjian, Family Law
and the Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment, Symposium: Recent Developments in Pennsylvania Family Law, 25 VILL. L. REV. 677 (1980).
35. See, e.g., Butler v. Butler, 464 Pa. 522, 527-28, 347 A.2d 477, 480 (1975) (holding that
contributions by either spouse toward purchase of entireties property are presumed to be a gift
to the other spouse, contrary to previous presumption that when a husband obtained wife's
property without adequate consideration a constructive trust was created in her favor); Henderson v. Henderson, 458 Pa. 97, 101-02, 327 A.2d 60, 62 (1974) (support not dependent upon sex,
but rather upon the financial need of the parties); Conway v. Dana, 456 Pa. 536, 539-40, 318
A.2d 324, 326 (1974) (support of minor children is the equal responsibility of both husband and
wife and support order must take into account assets of both parents, not lust the father). For a
more detailed discussion of these decisions, see Momjian, supra note 34, at 677-78, 685-86,
692-93.
36. 457 Pa. 90, 320 A.2d 139 (1974).
37. Id. at 91, 320 A.2d at 139.
38. Id. at 94, 320 A.2d at 141. The court declared:
We agree that if the husband may recover for loss of consortium, to deny the wife an
equal right would be invalid under the Pennsylvania Constitution. To draw such a distinction would have no rational or proper foundation at law, and would clearly be a form of
invalid discrimination based strictly on sex. It would also be unfair. Today a husband and
wife are equal partners in a marital relationship, and, as such, should be treated equally
under the law with respect to that relationship.
Id. at 93, 320 A.2d at 140. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that, alternatively, it
could have eliminated the husband's right of recovery for loss of consortium, but, contrary to
the majority in the Neuberg case, the majority in Hopkins believed that a husband should
continue to recover for the loss. Id. at 93-94, 320 A.2d at 141. For other post-Neuberg decisions
upholding the husband's right to recover for loss of consortium, see Link v. Highway Express
Lines, Inc., 444 Pa. 447, 452, 282 A.2d 727, 729-30 (1971); Brown v. Philadelphia Transp. Co.,
437 Pa. 348, 351, 263 A.2d 423, 424-25 (1970) (affirmance by an equally divided court).
39. 459 Pa. 641, 331 A.2d 174 (1975).
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erty are presumed to be jointly owned, irrespective of who purchased
the items. 40 In so holdin g, the DiFlorido court reversed the common law presumption that such property was owned by the husband 41 and recognized the nonmonetary contributions of both
42
spouses to the marriage.
The major sexist doctrine remaining from common law which has
yet to be eradicated is the principle that the choice of the marital
domicile is the husband's. 43 Under this theory, if the wife refuses to
move with the husband, her obstinence constitutes an act of desertion. 44
2. Child as Property
Traditionally, children had few rights in the area of family law.
They had no right to counsel in any proceedings for they were presumed to be represented by their parents and the state in the person
of the judge. 45 Recently, the issue of the child's right to counsel has
come to the forefront due to a growing awareness that the legal protection of children can be overlooked'in actions brought by litigating
46
parents or conducted under the pressure of clogged court dockets.
The right to counsel for children depends on the nature of the
proceeding. In proceedings under the Juvenile Act, the right is established by statute. 4 7 Under the Adoption Act, 4 8 however, no such
right presently exists 4 9 although pending legislation would mandate
40. Id. at 649-50, 331 A.2d at 179.
41. See, e.g., In re King Estate, 387 Pa. 119, 127-28, 126 A.2d 463, 467 (1956) (presumption
can be overcome by sufficient evidence of wife's ownership); Dura Seal Prods. Co. v. Carver,
186 Pa. Super. Ct. 425, 426, 140 A.2d 844, 845 (1958) (presumption exists whenever the husband and wife are living together and jointly using the household goods).
42. 459 Pa. at 650-51, 331 A.2d at 179-80.
43. See, e.g., Pochiba v. Pochiba, 254 Pa. Super. Ct. 134, 135, 385 A.2d 562, 562 (1978)
(per curiam); Smith v. Smith, 235 Pa. Super. Ct. 286, 288-89, 340 A.2d 552, 553 (1975); Santarsiero v. Santarsiero, 231 Pa. Super. Ct. 286, 288, 331 A.2d 868, 869 (1974). See also Momnjian,
supra note 34, at 688-89.
44. See authorities cited note 43 supra.

45.
omnon's
further
Bertin

See Foster & Freed, Child Custody, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 423 (1964); Shepherd, SolSword: Adjudication of Child Custody Questions, 8 U. Ricii. L. REV. 151 (1974). For
discussion of this presumption and the problems associated with its application, see
& Anthony Klein, Pennsylvania's Developing Child Custody Law, Symposium: Recent

Developments in Pennsylvania Family Law, 25 VILL. L. RLV. 752, 771-74, 775-76 (1980).
46. See, e.g., Bertin & Anthony, supra note 45, at 771-74, 775-76; Cenden, Separate Legal Representation for Children: Protecting the Rights and Interests of Minors in Judicial Proceedings, 11

HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REXv. 565 (1976); Inker & Perretta, A Child's Right to Counsel in Custody
Cases, 5 FAM. L.Q. 108 (1971); Note, A Child's Due Process Right to Counsel in Divorce
Custody Proceedings, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 917 (1976).
47. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6337 (Purdon 1980).
48. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §§ 101-603 (Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1979).
49. See In re Kapcsos, 468 Pa. 50, 59, 360 A.2d 174, 178 (1976). In In re Kapcsos, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court observed that both the natural parent and the state purport to

represent the child in proceedings to terminate parental rights, and that the court is also required to represent the interests of the child. Id. at 58, 360 A.2d at 178. Although it noted the
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legal representation for children in all adoption cases, especially
50
where a natural parent's rights are being terminated.

Historically, the "tender years" presumption gave the mother
almost the equivalent of a property right in her children. 51 This
doctrine provided that children under fourteen years of age were
presumed to belong with the mother, unless she was proven to be
unfit. 52 Gradually, this presumption was eroded5 3 until it was es54
sentially abrogated in Commonwealth ex rel. Spriggs v. Carson,
wherein the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated:
We also question the legitimacy of a doctrine that is predicated
upon traditional or stereotypic roles of men and women in a marital union. Whether the tender years doctrine is employed to create
a presumption which requires the male parent to overcome its effect by presenting compelling contrary evidence of a particular nature, or merely as a makeshift where the scales are relatively balanced, such a view is offensive to the concept of the equality of the
sexes which we have embraced as a constitutional principle within
55
this jurisdiction.

As the concept of the child as property vanishes from our law,
courts, in an effort to focus on the child's best interests, have increas-

suggestion of many commentators that counsel for the child would be beneficial in custody and
adoption proceedings, the court was unable to find a constitutional right to such representation.
Id. at 59, 360 A.2d at 178. The appointment of counsel was found to be discretionary with the
lower court when "such representation is necessary or beneficial." Id. But see id. at 62-63, 360
A.2d at 180 (Manderino, J., dissenting) (children have independent interests and deserve independent representation; court should exercise supervisory rulemaking powers to require counsel
for children). For a discussion of the right to counsel in child custody cases, see Bertin &
Anthony Klein, supra note 45. at 771-74. 775-76.
50. S. 236, Pa. Senate, 1979 Sess. § 348(a); H. 213, Pa. House, 1979 Sess. § 2313; H. 450,
Pa. House, 1979 Sess. § 343.
51. This doctrine was first established in Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Addicks, 5
Binn. 520, 521 (Pa. 1813).
52. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Lucas v. Kreischer, 450 Pa. 352, 355, 299 A.2d 243,
245 (1973); Commonwealth ex rel. Fox v. Fox, 216 Pa. Super. Ct. 11, 13, 260 A.2d 470, 470-71
(1969); Commonwealth ex rel. Logue v. Logue, 194 Pa. Super. Ct. 210, 215-16, 166 A.2d 60,
63-64 (1960).
53. For a discussion of the principle that the tender years doctrine is not absolute and can
be overcome by facts showing that its application would not be in the best interest of the child,
see Commonwealth ex rel. Parikh v. Parikh, 449 Pa. 105, 296 A.2d 625 (1972); Commonwealth
ex rel. Rainford v. Cirillo, 222 Pa. Super. Ct. 591, 296 A.2d 838 (1972). For a review of the
developing case law, see A. MOMJIAN & N. PERLBERGER, PENNSYLVANIA FAMILY LAW § 5.1.1
(1978); Bertin & Anthony Klein, supra note 45, at 753-55.
54. 470 Pa. 290, 368 A.2d 635 (1977) (plurality opinion). Although Spriggs involved a plurality opinion, lower courts have read the decision as abrogating the tender years doctrine. See
McGowan v. McGowan, 248 Pa. Super. Ct. 41, 374 A.2d 1306 (1977); Commonwealth ex rel.
Lee v. Lee, 248 Pa. Super. Ct. 155, 374 A.2d 1365 (1977). See also Bertin & Anthony Klein,
supra note 45, at 754-55.
55. 470 Pa. at 299-300, 368 A.2d at 639-40 (citations omitted).
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ingly permitted the child to express his or her preference regarding
custody arrangements. 56 Nevertheless, children frequently remain
57
pawns in divorce cases and are used mercilessly by their parents.
Custody and visitation demands are often presented for obvious
strategical purposes, without a sincere intention or desire on behalf of
the parent to secure the requested rights. 58 Children are utilized as
weapons by parents who withhold access to them, engage in outright
abduction of them and/or instill in them hostile feelings toward the
other parent. 59 Practitioners must see the children as persons, not
property, and refuse to aid parents in pressing vindictive, baseless
claims or engaging in harmful tactics.
B. The Nature of the Marital Eslate
Pennsylvania recently enacted a divorce law which converted the
Commonwealth from a common law to an equitable distribution
state. 60 Under the Pennsylvania common law approach, property
owned by a married person was subject to post-divorce partition according to title. 6' All jointly owned property was required to be
divided equally, irrespective of who the purchaser was. 62 The divorce converted a jointly owned estate into a tenancy in common
entitling either spouse to partition. 63 Once partition had taken place,
64 If
inequality in the estates of the parties could not be considered.
all of the property was titled in the name of one of the parties, there
was nothing to partition and, hence, the property remained the sole
and separate property of the owner. Property titled separately was

56. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Grillo v. Shuster, 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 229, 237-38, 312
A.2d 58, 63 (1973); Commonwealth ex rel. Morales v. Morales, 222 Pa. Super. Ct. 373, 376,
294 A.2d 782, 783 (1972).
57. See Kaslow, supra note 1, at 731-32.

58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See DIVORCE CODE, Act No. 1980-26, §§ 401-404, 1980 Pa. Legis. Serv. 55-58
(hereinafter cited as DiVOnCE CODE). For an in-depth discussion of the new Divorce Code, see
Gold-Bikin & Rounick, The New Pennsylvania Divorce Code, Symposium: Recent Developments
in Pennsylvania Family Law, 25 VuiL. L. REv. 617 (1980). For an analysis of the various property distribution systems utilized by American jurisdictions, see id. at 623-27 & nn. 51 & 64;
Greene, Comparison of the Property Aspects of the Community Property and Common-Law
Marital Property Systems and Their Relative Compatibility tith the Current Viewc of the Marriage Relationship and the Rights of Women, 13 CREIGHTON L. REx'. 71, 97-104 (1979); Morrissey, A Pennsylvania Primerfo r Alimony and Equitable Distribution, 47 PA. B.A.Q. 503, 503-14
(1976).
61. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 141 (Purdon 1965) (repealed 1980). PA. SWAT. ANN. tit.
68, § 501 (Purdon Supp. 1979) (repealed 1980).
62. See PA. STAr. ANN.

tit. 68, § 501 (Purdon Supp. 1979) (repealed 1980).

63. Id.
64. See DeBernard v. l)eBernard, 384 Pa. 194, 197, 120 A.2d 176, 178 (1956).
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not subject to division in the absence of fraud, duress, mistake, or
undue influence.65
The new Pennsylvania statute, however, provides that the court
granting a decree of divorce or annulment shall, on the request of
either spouse, "equitably divide, distribute or assign the marital
property between the parties without regard to marital misconduct in
such proportions as the court deems just," 66 giving consideration to
all relevant factors. 67 Marital property is defined as "all property
acquired by either party during the marriage" 68 with certain specified
exceptions, including property excluded by a valid agreement betveen the parties. 6 9 The statute includes a provision directing that
title should be disregarded in the definition and distribution of marital property, 7 0 and provides for a presumption that all property acquired by either spouse during the marriage constitutes marital property. 7 1 Additionally, the new law includes a provision for alimony, to
be granted at the discretion of the court, but only if the party seeking
the award lacks sufficient property after distribution to provide for his

65. See id.
66. DIVORCE CODE, supra note 60, § 401(d). For a detailed discussion of equitable distribu-

tion under the new Pennsylvania Divorce Code, see Gold-Bikin & Rounick, supra note 60, at
625-27.
67. The Divorce Code lists the following factors:
(1) The length of the marriage.
(2) Any prior marriage of either party.
(3) The age, health, station, amount and sources of income, vocational skills,
employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties.
(4) The contribution by one party to the education, training, or increased earning
power of the other party.
(5) The opportunity of each party for future acquisitions of capital assets and income.
(6) The sources of income of both parties, including but not limited to medical, retirement, insurance or other benefits.
(7) The contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preservation, depreciation or appreciation of the marital property, including the contribution of a party as
a homemaker.
(8) The value of the property set apart to each party.
(9) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage.
(10) The economic circumstances of each party at the time the division of property is
to become effective.
DIVORCE CODE, supra note 60, § 401(d).
68. Id. § 401(e).
69. Id. Other exceptions include 1) property acquired by gift or inheritance except for the
increase in value during the marriage; 2) property acquired after separation and before the date
of divorce; 3) property disposed of in good faith for value prior to the commencement of divorce
proceedings; and 4) property to the extent it has been mortgaged or encumbered in good faith
for value prior to the commencement of divorce proceedings. Id.
70. Id. § 401(0.
71. Id. The presumption may be overcome by evidence that it was acquired by one of the
methods listed in § 401(e). Id. See note 69 and accompanying text supra.
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or her reasonable needs and is unable to support himself or herself
72
through employment.
IV.

CHOOSING THE MEANS FOR PROPERTY DISTRIBUTIONTHROUGH THE COURT OR BY CONTRACT?

The new Pennsylvania equitable distribution legislation provides
for a more favorable division of assets than the common law, 73 espe-

cially when the assets are not jointly or proportionately owned. 74 The
outcome in court is now less predictable, however, since all divisions
75
are within the judge's sole discretion.
The alternative to litigating property division is the marital
agreement, a vehicle favored by the courts since it lessens judicial
involvement and represents a compromise satisfactory to the parties. 76 Agreements also avoid the inevitable hostilities of litigation and
the airing of personal, and often embarrassing, facts.
Agreements are usually in writing. Courts have, however, enforced agreements entered into in open court 77 and oral agreements
between authorized counsel which later could not be reduced to writing because of a subsequent change of mind on the part of a client. 78
When found to be valid, marital agreements are enforceable either at
law in an assumpsit action or in equity in an action for specific performance. 79 Courts are also empowered to approve the agreement
and incorporate it into the divorce decree. 80 In this way, the parties'

72. DIVORCE CODE, supra note 60, § 501(a). In determining the necessity of alimony, as
well as the amount, duration and scope of the award, the court is directed to consider all
relevant factors. Some of those identified in the statute include: 1) the relative earring capacities
of the parties; 2) the ages and physical or mental conditions of the parties; 3) sources of income
and expectancies or inheritances of either spouse; 4) the duration of, and standard of living
during, the marriage; 5) the education and skills of the parties in terms of their employability,
including consideration of whether employment would be inappropriate for a party with custody
of a minor child; 6) the relative needs, assets, and liabilities of the parties; and 7) the marital
misconduct of either party during the marriage excluding any period of separation subsequent to
the filing of the divorce complaint. Id. § 501(b). For a detailed discussion of the alimony provisions of the new Pennsylvania Divorce Code, see Gold-Bikin & Rounick, supra note 60, at
628-29.
73. Compare notes 61-65 and accompanying text supra with notes 66-72 and accompanying
text supra.
74. See note 65 and accompanying text supra.
75. DIVORCE CODE, supra note 60, § 401. Section 404 of the Divorce Code does require
the court to express the reasons for the distribution of property which it orders. Id. § 404.
76. See Estate of Friedman, 483 Pa. 614, 626, 398 A.2d 615, 621 (1979).
77. See Bredt v. Bredt, 231 Pa. Super. Ct. 65, 69-70, 326 A.2d 446, 448-49 (1974).
78. See Springer v. Springer, 255 Pa. Super. Ct. 35, 38, 386 A.2d 122, 124 (1978).
79. See Exner v. Exner, __ Pa. Super. Ct. -, 407 A.2d 1342 (1979).
80. See DiVORCE CODE, supra note 60, § 501(f); cf Bredt v. Bredt, 231 Pa. Super. Ct. 65,
326 A.2d 446 (1974) (oral agreement between parties enforced by court as valid support order).
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agreement becomes an order of the court and is enforceable as
stch. 81

Except for matters of child custody and child support which are
sUl)ject to modification if circumstances necessitate a change, all substantive terms agreed upon by the parties are enforceable. 8 2 Property issues have been resolved by property settlements or separation
agreements entered into after marriage and such contracts have been
enforced. 83 In addition to these traditional post-marriage contractual
resolutions, however, more and more parties are contracting before
marriage in the form of antenuptial agreements.8 4 If these agree-

ments either evidence fill and fair disclosure of the assets and income
of the parties or are reasonable in their provisions, they are fully valid
and binding. 85

Antenuptial agreements typically alter, determine, or extinguish
the statutory rights of the surviving spouse in the estate of the deceased spouse.8

6

They may also properly limit the amount, if any, of

a spouse's support obligations and property claims in the event of
separation or divorce.8 7

Such agreements make it possible, there-

81. See DI'ORCE CODE, supra note 60, §§ 501(f), 503. For the problems inherent in the
contractual solution, see Gold-Bikin & Rounick, supra note 60, at 627.
82. See Lurie v. Lurie, 246 Pa. Super. Ct. 307, 311, 370 A.2d 739, 741 (1976).
83. See id.
84. See, e.g., Estate of Friedman, 483 Pa. 614, 398 A.2d 615 (1979); Hillegass Estate, 431
Pa. 144, 244 A.2d 672 (1968); McGannon v. McGainon, 241 Pa. Super, Ct. 45, 359 A.2d 431
(1976).
85. See, e.g., Estate of Friedman, 483 Pa. 614, 398 A.2d 615 (1979); Hillegass Estate, 431
Pa. 144, 244 A.2d 672 (1968). In Friedman, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court set forth the
following standards for evaluating the validity of an antenuptial agreement:
(1) An Antenuptial Agreement is presumptively valid and binding upon the parties
thereto.
(2) The person seeking to nullify or avoid or circumvent the Agreement has the hurden of proving the invalidity of the Agreement by clear and convincing evidence that the
[other] spOtise at the time of the Agreement made neither (a) a reasonable provision for
the intended spouse, nor (b) a full and fair disclosure of his (or her) worth.
(3) In evaluating the reasonableness of the provision for the [intended spouse], such
reasonableness must be determined as of the time of the Agreement and not by hindsight.
Reasonableness will depend upon the totality of all the facts and circumstances at the time
of the Agreement, including (a) the financial worth of the intended husband; (b) the financial status of the intended wife; (c) the age of the parties; (d) the number of children each
has; (e) the intelligence of the parties; (f) whether the [intended spousel aided in the
accumulation of the wealth of the [other] spouse; and (g) the standard of living which the
[intended spouse] had before marriage and could reasonably expect to have during marriage.
(4) Full and fair disclosure does not require the disclosure of the exact amount of his
or her property.
483 Pa. at 626-27, 398 A.2d at 621, quoting Hillegass Estate, 431 Pa. 144, 149-51, 244 A.2d
672, 675-76 (1968) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
86. See, e.g., Estate of Slight, 467 Pa. 619, 623, 359 A.2d 773, 775 (1976); Harrison Estate,
456 Pa. 356, 359, 319 A.2d 5, 7 (1974).
87. See Estate of Slight, 467 Pa. 619, 623, 359 A.2d 773, 775 (1976). The Slight court noted
that, traditionally, agreements purporting to relieve a husband of his support obligation during
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fore, to negotiate while the parties are unaffected by the pain and
hostility of separation or divorce.
Similarly, precohabitation agreements -entered into by the parties in anticipation of living together without the benefit or thought of
marriage-help to avoid the difficulties of property division by providing for a scheme of distribution before any bitterness has arisen
between the parties. Precohabitation agreements concerning support
and property division seek to protect persons living together against
potential disputes upon break-up because, frequently, these relationships are of long duration and involve pooling the income and assets
of two wage earners. These rather novel contracts are being utilized
with increasing frequency as a result of the Marvin v. Marvin decision 8 8 which recognized both the viability of written and oral agreements in this area and the equitable roots of rights and liabilities
resulting from cohabitation. 8 9
Thus, the problems associated with property disputes after separation may be lessened or entirely eliminated by either an antenuptial or a precohabitation agreement. In the absence of one of these
documents, which many couples view as cold and calculated blueprints for the future demise of a marriage or relationship, the postnuptial agreement, or property settlement is eminently more favorable
than the experience of the courtroom. Recognizing that agreements
are not always possible, the practitioner may still claim a measure of
success when the majority, if not the overwhelming predominance, of
his cases end in settlement rather than court order.
V.

TAx PITFALLS IN PROPERTY TRANSFERS

No discussion of property division can ignore the serious tax consequences of the sale and transfer of property. The practitioner
should not forget, nor fail to appreciate, the tax significance of an
agreement or court order. The transfer of ownership of any appreciated property from one spouse to the other results in a taxable

marriage have been viewed with suspicion since the obligation has been judged as one "imposed by law as an incident of the marital status and the legal unity of husband and wife." id. at
623 n.6, 359 A.2d at 775 n.6, quoting Commonwealth ex rel. Roviello v. Roviello, 229 Pa.
Super. Ct. 428, 435, 323 A.2d 766, 770-71 (1974) (citations omitted). Nevertheless, the court
pointed out that "there is nothing to prevent a contractual agreement between a prospective
husband and wife from speaking . . . to financial affairs during [the marriage], including a disavowal of the husband's duty of support." 467 Pa. at 623, 359 A.2d at 775 (footnote omitted).
88. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976), implemented on remand 5
Fain. L. Rep. 3077 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1979).
89. 18 Cal. 3d at 673-85, 557 P.2d at 115-23, 134 Cal. Rptr. 824-32.
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event increasing the gross income of the transferor.9 0 The taxable
gain is measured by the difference between the fair market value at
the time of transfer and the adjusted basis of the property. 9 ' The
recipient of the property is deemed to have given equal value in settlement of the marital interests and does not realize any tax gain or
loss. 9 2 The timing of the transfer is also important. For example,
transfers of real estate between husband and wife during the marriage
are exempt from Pennsylvana real estate taxes;a3 however, transfers
agreed upon prior to divorce, but actually occurring more than three
94
months after divorce, result in transfer taxes for both parties.
The above discussion is necessarily simplistic since the tax aspects of separation and divorce are highly technical and applicable to
many aspects of the dissolution of the marital relationship.9 5 The
practitioner is advised to become acquainted with the provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code, together with the regulations and rulings
applying these laws to given circumstances. Various sources are avail96
able for edification and consultation purposes.
VI. CONCLUSION

Issues concerning property division are complicated by the fact
that, after realizing that divorce is inevitable, the parties often make
the property involved the focus of a struggle. The struggle may represent a symbolic expression of insecurity, revenge, or unhappiness.
The ability of the attorney to negotiate effectively and arrive at a
result pleasing to the client depends upon the strength of the client's
factual position. The emotional condition of the client, the circumstances of the separation, the marital history, the financial situation, and the existence of children are all factors which vary the
likelihood of success. The more residual pain that remains after separation, the more one can expect the property phase to be difficult
and protracted. An understanding of the client's emotions and open
communications are the essential ingredients for successful representation.

90. See United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962); I.R.C. § 1001.
91. See United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 71-74 (1962).

92. Id. at 72.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 3284-3285 (Purdon Supp. 1980).
Id. The rate of tax is one per cent of the value of the property. Id. § 3285.
See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 71, 215.
In addition to the federal statutory and regulatory materials, see, e.g., COMMERCE

CLEARING

HOUSE,

INC.,

TAX PLANNING AND DIVORCE PREPARATION (Pamphlet No. 4844,

1975); A. MOMJIAN & N. PERLBERGER, supra note 60; Gutman & Sander, Divorce and Separation, TAX MNGM'T (BNA) No. 95-3rd (1975).
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The legal issues are also extremely complex. The practitioner
must carefully determine the extent of' the actual and potential marital estate through verification of tax returns, bank statements, and
other writings evidencing ownership or interest in assets, both personal and business. Both informal and f'ormal discovery may be essential to meaningful property discussions. Decisions must be delicately
and tactfully made regarding the advisability and timing of negotiations or litigation concerning the treatment of property and income
pending a final decree in divorce. Alternative means, including antenuptial or precohabitation agreements as well as marriage counseling prior to separation, should be explored, if possible, in order to
resolve potential or existing problems. If the practitioner is faced with
a fait accompli, the least protracted approach should be sought.
In the final analysis, the client controls the decisionmaking aided
by the attorney's guidance and advice on the legal and tax ramifications of the property settlement. As with most situations involving
legal representation of this type, neither party is ever entirely satisfied with the attorney's effort. Perhaps the maxim is true that if both
sides are unhappy with the result, equity has been obtained.
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